INFORMS Journal on Computing
HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
 QUICK SEARCH:   [advanced]


     


INFORMS JOURNAL ON COMPUTING
Vol. 17, No. 4, Fall 2005, pp. 475-489
DOI: 10.1287/ijoc.1040.0072
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow reprints & permissions
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Jones, J. L.
Right arrow Articles by Koehler, G. J.
Right arrow Search for Related Content

A Heuristic for Winner Determination in Rule-Based Combinatorial Auctions

Joni L. Jones, Gary J. Koehler

Information Systems and Decision Sciences, College of Business Administration, University of South Florida, 4202 East Fowler Avenue, Tampa, Florida 33620-7800, USA
John B. Higdon Eminent Scholar and Professor of Decision and Information Sciences, Warrington College of Business, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611, USA

jjones{at}coba.usf.edu
koehler{at}ufl.edu

Combinatorial auctions address the sale of materials where there exist complementarities between items. A major stumbling block to the widespread use of combinatorial auctions is the complexity of the winner-determination problem, which is known to be NP-complete. We consider a rich version of combinatorial auctions, rule-based combinatorial auctions, where bids consist of rules that describe acceptable bundles rather than provide complete enumerations of acceptable bundles. This makes the winner-determination problem potentially harder because the problem must find bundles meeting bid criterion as well as finding an optimal selection of winning bids. This paper describes in detail a heuristic that achieves a satisfying solution to the winner-determination problem for large problems where exact solutions may not be attainable. Our contribution is threefold. First, we give a general approach to providing good approximations to the winner-determination problem for rule-based auctions. Although the approach requires adaptation for specific instances, it is conceptually tractable and implementable. Second, the approach is illustrated and tested on an auction format for selling prime-time television advertising time formed from data and interviews with industry sources. Third, while some researchers have used commercial solvers that appeared to obviate the need for specialized solution approaches to the winner-determination problem, we give evidence that, at least for the problem studied here, specialized approaches are necessary.

Key words: heuristic; combinatorics; bidding-auctions; branch-and-bound
History: received January 2003; revised June 2003; accepted September 2003.







HOME HELP FEEDBACK SUBSCRIPTIONS ARCHIVE SEARCH TABLE OF CONTENTS
Copyright © 2005 by INFORMS.